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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN
CONTRACTS BY CORRESPONDENCE*
WHEN contracting parties deal with one another by mail or telegram, courts
almost uniformly consider the deposit of an "acceptance" with the transmitting
agency as the moment of contract birth.1 While operation of this "deposited
acceptance" rule is said to be conditioned upon an express or implied author-
ization by the offeror of the offeree's use of the specific transmission service,2
this condition is rarely found absent. Judicial construction traditionally has
made a mailed or telegraphed offer an implied invitation to accept by the same
medium of communication. 3
Since first established in the famous King's Bench case of Adamts v. Lind-
sell,4 the deposited acceptance rule has been applied by the courts of England
and the United States with strict regard for stare decisis.r In Dick v. Unitcd
* Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
1. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 81 n.2, 3, 4 (rev. ed. 1936) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNT CrTS
§ 64 (1932).
2. 1 WILLIsToN, CoxsaAcTs § 83 n.1, 2, 3, 4; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAc"s § 64.
3. 1 WILLsrON, CoNTRAcTs § 83 n.1, 2, 3, 4; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs § 66. Ac-
ceptance by a medium of communication neither expressly nor impliedly authorized by the
offeror moves the moment of contract birth up to the delivery of the acceptance to the
offeror. Thus, an offeror may revoke his offer, and an offeree may withdraw or revoke
his acceptance, at any time prior to such delivery. Accordingly, if such an "unauthorized"
acceptance becomes lost en route to the offeror, or if such an acceptance becomes delayed
beyond that reasonable period in which the offer is "open," no contract will be formed.
While it may under most circumstances be fair to assume that a mailed acceptance will be
too late to bind one whose offer was sent by telegram, it is difficult to understand why a
telegraphed acceptance should not be proper where the offer was mailed. If the deposited
acceptance rule is practical in a given fact situation, its application should not turn upon
"authorization," but rather, on the convenience of the contracting parties. In order to
avoid the difficulties that might arise under an overly technical application of the "au-
thorization" doctrine, the draftsmen of the new Commercial Code have rejected the doc-
trine entirely, and substituted in its place the proposal that any medium of communication
may be permissible if "reasonable in the circumstances." UNIoRM CO~MaEcIAL CoDE
§ 2-206 (1) (a) (May Draft, 1949).
4. 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
5. See cases cited, 1 WILL SToN, CoraTAc'rs § 81 n.4. McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co.,
1 Pick. 277 (Mass. 1882) (offer to insure held revocable until acceptance reaches offeror),
is the only reported English or American decisidn in which the contract was held to be
binding only when the acceptance reached the offeror. Although never explicitly over-
ruled, its future application in Massachusetts seems doubtful. See Brauer v, Shaw, 168
Mass. 198, 200, 46 N.E. 617, 618 (1897) (offer to let space on cargo ship held not re-
vocable after dispatch of telegraphed acceptance). But cf. Traders' Nat. Bank v. First
Nat Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920) (drawee bank's acceptance of check held
voidable by withdrawal of letter containing acceptance from mails) ; Guardian Nat. Bank
v. Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933) (acceptance or
payment of check held not irrevocable where drawee bank withdrew from mails credit
letter before it reached collecting bank).
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States,G however, the Court of Claims refused to follow this long chain of
precedent.
After executing and mailing an acceptance of a government propeller pur-
chase order, plaintiff manufacturer, sole bidder on the contract, discovered
that he had erroneously understood the agreement as calling for only one-half
the parts actually required. He immediately wired the government pur-
chasing officer that the purchase price should be doubled, and this notice
reached the government officer before the previously mailed acceptance. Re-
formation negotiations were then commenced and, apparently confident of
their successful outcome, plaintiff manufactured and delivered the entire
quantity of parts. When the reformation negotiations failed, action was
brought by plaintiff to recover the fair value of the additional parts. Demur-
ring to the complaint, the government alleged that it had received no notice of
the mistake until after a binding contract had been formed by the plaintiff's
mailing of the accepted purchase order7 The demurrer was overruled.
To get this result, the Court of Claims felt that it was faced with the choice
of eithdr overruling the venerable doctrine that unilateral mistake is irrelevant,8
or refusing to apply the equally venerable deposited acceptance rule. It took
the latter course. The court based its opinion upon United States Postal Reg-
ulations which permit the sender of deposited mail to recover it at any time
prior to its actual delivery to the addressee.9  Stating the traditional view
that the deposited acceptance rule rests on the theory that an offeree abandons
physical control of his acceptance by depositing it in the mail,10 the court sug-
6. 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct Cl. 1949).
7. Brief for Defendant filed in argument on demurrer, p. 13. See discussion of ntis-
take doctrine, note 8 infra.
8. Ordinarily, for a party to obtain relief under mistake doctrines, it must be shown
that the mistake was mutual or so palpable that the other party must have known of it.
Both possibilities would have been difficult to show in the principal case. The govern-
ment did not have actual prior notice before the acceptance ,as mailed. Nor did it have
experience in previous purchases of this sort so as to be able to judge the palpable nature
of plaintiff's mistake. For discussion of the mistake doctrine see 1 WniLxsow, Co.TmAcrs
§ 94; 5 VLISTON, CoxTrAcTs § 1578; Lubell, Unilateral Palpable and Impalpable Mis-
take in Construction Contracts, 16 Inr. L. REv. 137 (1932); Patterson, Equitable Re-
lief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 Cor. L. REv. 859 (1928). For views urging liberalization
of the doctrines of unilateral mistake, see Sharp, Willislon on Contracts, 4 U. oF Cm. L
Rnv. 30, 31-9 (1936) ; Judge Frank's concurring opinion in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R,
153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Note 5, U. OF CHL L. REV. 446 (1938).
9. 39 CODE FED. REGS. § § 10.9, 10.10, 16.17 (1938).
10. 82 F. Supp. 326, 329 (1949). Although the more common explanation of the de-
posited acceptance rule is cast in agency terminology, this is essdhtially a control theory.
In agency language, the depositing of the acceptance with the transmitting service is
deemed to be a handing over of the acceptance to the agent of the offeror. See cases
cited, 1 Wn.msrox, CoxTRAcTs § 81 n. Whether the deposited acceptance rule is cast
in terms of agency or control, the underlying thought is that the depositing of the ac-
ceptance makes it irretrievable by the offeree. Of course, even if the depositing were to
mean that the offeree could not recover his acceptance-which it does not-it would not
necessarily follow that the contract should become binding at that moment. The courts
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gested that the rule should not be applied where, as here, the Postal Regula-
tions permit its recovery." In propounding this truly remarkable theory, the
court in effect nullified the deposited acceptance rule completely, since under
existing regulations all letters can be recovered, and wires may also be stopped
if intercepted in time by a subsequent telegram.'2
What purports to be a more practical approach to the problem of offer and
acceptance by correspondence is offered by commentators who urge retention
of the deposited acceptance rule solely for its utilitarian value as a "business-
man's rule".' 3 The argument is that if the contract were not considered bind-
ing until the acceptance reached the offeror, an offeree could not go ahead on
the deal before that time without risking the arrival of a revocation from the
offeror. Such a revocation would be effective under standard contract doc-
trine that a promise unsupported by consideration is not binding.14
Doubtless, immediate offeree-reliance is vital in some businesses-especially
those concerned with rapid purchase and resale transactions." But there is
some evidence which indicates that not all businessmen regard the deposited
acceptance rule favorably. A recent study of the contract practices of ten
leading Connecticut business concerns in varying industries shows that a num-
ber of businessmen not only dislike the rule generally, but also fear that its
application to their own business would reward "unfair" business practice.
Of the ten concerns interviewed, only one admitted unqualified approval of
the rule.10 Some had never heard of it. Unfortunately, the survey was of
might have, had they wished, picked any point in the negotiations as the moment of con.
tract birth.
11. 82 F. Supp. 326, 329 (1949). As an alternative rationale for its decision, the
court could have stated that the government, by carrying on reformation negotiations, was
estopped from claiming "acceptance.'
12. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from H. C. Crutchfield, Superintend-
ent, Western Union Telegraph Co., New Haven, Conn., dated Nov. 18, 1949, in Yale Law
Library.
13. CORBIN, CASEs oN CONTRACTS 72-3 (3d ed. 1947) ; Llewellyn, Our Case Law of
Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 48 YAtz L.J. 779, 795 (1939) ; Winfield, Sonme Aspects
of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L.Q. REV. 499, 505-15 (1939) ; 34 CORNELL L, Q. 632 (1949)
(principal case discussed) ; 62 HARv. L. RTv. 1231 (1949) (principal case discussed) ; 35
VA. L. REV. 508 (1949) (principal case discussed). But see LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF TU,
LAw OF CONTRACTS 15-21 (2d ed. 1880) ; Nussbaum, Coiparative Aspects of the Anglo-
American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COL. L. REV. 920 (1936).
14. Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (C.A. 1876). 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 55;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 34, 35.
15. The likelihood is that most transactions of this sort can and will be carricd out
by telephone. Of coursle, where' telephonic communication is available and practicable,
the deposited acceptance rule is of no importance.
16. Of the ten business concerns in Connecticut interviewed by questionnaire, eight
stated that they considered a contract binding only when the acceptance reaches the
offeror; five stated that they had never heard of the deposited acceptance rule; nine felt
that the rule's application without regard for their own business practices and understand-
ings might adversely affect their businesses and possibly reward unfair business practice.
Completed questionnaires in Yale Law Library.
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too limited a scope to warrant final conclusions either one way or the other-
if indeed final conclusions are obtainable. But the results make it doubtful
that the rule may aptly be called a businessman's rule.
This doubt is strengthened in the fact situation of the Dick case. Since
there were no other bidders on the contract,17 and since the notice of plaintiff's
mistake reached the government purchasing officer before the previously
mailed acceptance,' 8 it is difficult to see what real harm the government could
suffer by paying the fair price for the parts. Had the deposited acceptance
rule been applied, the government would have received a windfall of free
propeller parts, and the manufacturer would have lost the benefit of a fair
bargain.
Since common understanding on the tying or untying of a contract appar-
ently varies from market to market, the moral of the Dick case may well be
that blanket rules are to be avoided. There is always a danger that an un-
imaginative court may deprive someone of a profit which business custom and
usage would say he had made.'0
17. 82 F. Supp. 326, 327 (1949).
18. Id. at 328.
19. If custom or trade usage were offered into evidence in order to void a contract
that the law would otherwise regard as binding under the deposited acceptance rule, it is
possible that some courts would refuse to admit it. Thus far, courts have exhibited a re-
luctance to permit the introduction of trade usages and previous dealings for any purpose
other than interpretation of a contract. The general notion seems to be that custom and
usage may neither create nor void a contract. See, e.g., Stulsaft v. Mercer Tube & Mfg.
Co., 288 N.Y. 255, 43 N.E.2d 31 (1942) ; Hagedorn & Co. v. Godwin & Strauss, 142 Pa.
Super. 547, 16 A.2d 649 (1940).
An exception to the general rule that usage and custom may not create a contract is
made where evidence of previous dealings is offered to show that silence is intended to
mean assent. T. C. May Co. v. Menzies Shoe Co., 184 N.C. 150, 113 S.E. 593 (1922)
(custom may be shown to indicate that silence meant acceptance of order for shoes) ;
Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 141 Tenn. 679, 214 SMW. 817 (1919) (previous
dealings may be introduced to show that silence is intended to mean assent) ; 1 Wxums-
Tox, CoNTrAcrs §91C; RESTATEmENT, CoxrAcrs §72 (1)(c). The Cole-McIntyre-
Norfleet case is criticized, but the exception supported, in Corbin, When Silence Gives
Consent, 29 Y.uxn L.J. 441 (1920). An extension of this exception is possibly suggested
by way of dictum in Albert v. Farnsworth, 176 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1949), where the
court indicated that trade custom could, if shown to be clear and specific, be introduced
to replace a principle of law; but the custom offered Nas not shown to be adequately
clear. Moreover the dictum is apparently contradicted by another statement in the opinion
that custom may not create a contract.
The new Uniform Commerical Code neither denies nor affirms that previous dealings
or trade usages may create or void a contract. Section 1-205 (3) (May Draft, 1949)
states: "The parties to a contract are bound by any course of dealing between them and
by any usage of trade of which both are or should be aware and parties engaged in a
particular vocation or trade are bound by its usages.' Under "Purposes of Changes" the
draftsmen explain section 1-205: "(4) This Act deals with 'usage of trade' as a factor
in reaching the commercial meaning of the agreement which the parties have made."
(Emphasis added). Query: Is it to be inferred from this explanation that the function
of trade usage is to be limited to that of interpretation?
It is difficult to ascertain why there is this general hesitation to permit usage and
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But it can probably be said with great confidence that most courts are in-
genious enough to circumvent blanket rules where justice so demands."
Hence if it should be desirable as a limit to litigation to select an arbitrary
point at which a contract is formed, might not the court's holding in this case
be turned into a blanket validation of all revocations which overtake deposited
acceptances ?21 It is difficult to see how any gross injustice could result. The
offeror can always specify the manner and speed of acceptance, if they are
important to him.2 2  Moreover, permitting revocation would not in any way
increase the offeror's risks, since he cannot begin to rely before he hears from
the off eree.23  Should the opportunity to make a bargain elsewhere arise
while he is still unaware of the offeree's actions, he has merely to pick up a
telephone to find out. Indeed, given modem methods of quick communication,
perhaps the only function performed by an acceptance or revocation rule is to
determine which party has the burden of checking on the status of their ne-
gotiations.
THOMAS F. BlRtINt
custom to create or void a contract. In all probability the fear is that situations might
arise where parties would be bound by practices of which they had no knowledge. But
where the custom or usage offered is so notorious as to be common knowledge within a
trade, it would seem unduly cautious for a court to limit its use to mere interpretation.
There are times when custom is as meaningful as words. That courts have recognized
this is indicated by the frequent judicial use of a term like "implied-in-fact contracts."
What but custom is the operative "fact" from which the contract is "implied"? 1 Wiuis-
TOIr, CONTRACTS § 3; Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 HAV.
L. Ray. 376 (1920); Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17
CALa. L. REv. 441, 449-51 (1929).
20. In many instances, for example, it is very easy to say that an "acceptance" was
not an acceptance at all, but rather an "offer."
21. See INDIAN CONTRACT ACT §§4, 5 (Pollock ed. 1905). For a modified version
of this proposal, and a more traditional approach to this vital legal problem, see 62 HAv.
L. REv. 1231, 1232 (1949). See also REsTATEXmENT, CONTRACTS § 39 (1932), which vali-
dates an acceptance that overtakes a rejection.
22. See note 2 supra.
23. See note 21 supra.
t Member of the second-year class, Yale Law School.
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